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Modelling local growth control decisions in a multi-city case: Do 
spatial interactions and lobbying efforts matter? 
Katharina SCHONE, Wilfried KOCH, Catherine BAUMONT 
 
Résumé : Nous analysons les facteurs déterminant les décisions des communes françaises 
appartenant à une aire urbaine de prélever la taxe locale d’équipement, une participation 
financière demandée aux constructeurs pouvant être interprétée comme un instrument utilisé 
pour maîtriser la croissance urbaine. Cette décision est modélisée comme le résultat du jeu 
de pouvoir entre plusieurs groupes d’intérêt liés au foncier. En plus, les choix locaux sont 
considérés comme interdépendants, dû au fait que la décision d’une ville de contrôler sa 
croissance va augmenter la demande de logement dans ses villes voisines. La solution de 
notre  modèle  théorique  s’apparente  à  un  modèle  spatial  autorégressif,  faisant  de 
l’économétrie spatiale l’outil naturel pour l’estimation des interactions stratégiques au niveau 
local. Les résultats empiriques confirment nos prédictions. La décision de prélever la taxe 
locale d’équipement est influencée par le lobbying de groupes d’intérêt liés au foncier et sujet 
à  des  interactions  stratégiques  spatiales.  Mais  contrairement  à  l’opinion  générale  selon 
laquelle un contrôle strict de la croissance serait surtout le résultat de la pression exercée 
par les habitants-propriétaires, notre analyse révèle que les propriétaires-bailleurs sont la 
véritable force  déterminante.  Nos  résultats  donnent  également  de faibles  indices  pour  la 
présence de « coalitions de croissance ».  
Mots-clés : réglementation du foncier; maîtrise de la croissance ; groupes de pression ; 
économétrie spatiale 
 
Abstract : Our article analyses the determinants of the decision of French municipalities to 
raise the “taxe locale d’équipement”, a local development tax which can be regarded as a 
price measure to control growth. We model the decision to raise this tax as the result of a 
political struggle between different land-related interest groups. As a city’s decision to control 
its  development  raises  demand  for  housing  in  neighbouring  cities,  local  growth  control 
choices  have  to  be  considered  as  spatially  interdependent.  Our  spatial  econometric 
specification is directly derived from the theoretical model and thereby becomes a natural 
tool to estimate such strategic interactions between local governments. The empirical results 
confirm our predictions. The decision to raise the “taxe locale d’équipement” is influenced by 
the lobbying of land-related interest groups and subject to spatial strategic interaction. But 
against  the  general  presumption  that  growth  control  choices  are  mainly  determined  by 
resident  homeowners,  our  analysis  reveals  that  the  main  driving  force  seems  to  be 
“absentee” homeowners which act as landlords. We find weak evidence for the presence of 
“urban growth machines” in France. 
Keywords : land use regulation; growth control; lobbying; spatial econometrics 
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1  Introduction 
 
  In most industrialised countries local governments have extensive powers to manage 
and control their own geographic and demographic development, including a wide array of 
land  related  policies  such  as  zoning  rules,  land  taxation,  impact  fees  or  urban  growth 
boundaries, sometimes summarized under the term “growth controls”. These powers and 
their widespread use are generally justified as necessary corrections to market failure. In this 
perspective, growth controls are meant to limit the negative externalities related to urban 
growth (pollution, congestion …), to prevent urban sprawl and to guarantee a fair distribution 
of the fiscal burden entailed by urban growth. But at the same time, growth controls also 
greatly  impact  land  and  housing  prices. There  is now  a  large empirical literature on this 
question, which, to a large extent, concludes that growth controls raise housing prices and 
lower the value of undeveloped land (see Fischel, 1990, or Quigley and Rosenthal, 2005, for 
a  review  of  results).    In  view  of  these  important  financial  consequences  it  seems  quite 
plausible  to  assume  that  local  landowners  and  homeowners  will  try  to  influence  growth 
control  decisions.  Therefore,  the  decision  to  control  the  development  of  a  community  is 
probably not best described as being taken by a “benevolent dictator” with the only intention 
to maximise social welfare. On the contrary, it rather seems to be the result of a political 
struggle between different land related lobbies, each trying to influence (probably mainly self-
interested) local decision makers.  
 
  Theoretical models that describe growth control decisions as the result of a struggle 
for influence between different interest groups include Brueckner (1995), Brueckner and Lai 
(1996),  Glaeser  et  al.  (2005)  or  recently  Hilber  and  Robert-Nicoud  (2009).  The  major 
opponents in this political struggle are the owners of developed land (resident homeowners 
and landlords), which benefit from control-induced rising real estate values, and the owners 
of undeveloped land, logically opposed to every kind of measure limiting the possibilities to 
develop their property. 
At first view, the owners of undeveloped land, representing generally only a small 
percentage of the population, could be expected to have little influence on the local political 
decision  process.  But  according  to  the  still  popular  hypothesis  first  put  forth  by  Molotch 
(1976) and Logan and Molotch (1987), they gain in influence by forming an “urban growth 
machine”  with  members  of  the  local  business  elite,  such  as  local  employers,  banks  or 
building  firms,  who  all  have  a  natural  interest  in  local  expansionism.  Building  firms  are 
naturally interested in maximising the number of new constructions, which simultaneously   4 
raises profits for local banks that lend money to new homebuyers. Local employers support 
the  growth  machine  because  high  construction  rates  help  to  keep  housing  prices  down, 
which in turn permits them to pay their workers less.  
This  pro-growth  pressure  group  finds  itself  confronted  with  the  owners  of  already 
developed land. These can either live themselves in the house or apartment they possess or 
they can rent it out and act as landlords generally referred to as “absentee homeowners”. 
Resident homeowners and landlords both favour growth controls, but for slightly different 
reasons. Resident homeowners try to influence local decision making in order to defend their 
local  quality of life and to protect the value  of their homes. Absentee homeowners seek 
financial gains from control induced rent increases.  
  It is still an open question which of these two subgroups has the greatest interest for 
growth controls and exerts the strongest influence on local political decisions. The general 
view holds that local politics tend to be dominated by resident homeowners: the fact that their 
house generally represents their biggest single asset and that they are without any possibility 
to spread risks turns them into “homevoters”, a term coined by Fischel (2001). Brueckner and 
Lai  (1996)  and  Hilber  and  Robert-Nicoud  (2009),  on  the  contrary,  identify  the  “absentee 
homeowners” as the main driving force behind restrictive growth control politics. According to 
their analyses, resident homeowners can be imagined as paying rent to themselves, and for 
this reason a control-induced rent escalation would confer no benefits to them. Absentee 
homeowners, in contrast, would gain from rent increases, and so favour even more stringent 
growth  controls  than  resident  homeowners.  Following  the  line  of  reasoning  set  out  by 
Brueckner and Lai (1996) and Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2009), a higher homeownership 
rate could even be associated with less stringent growth controls, for the simple reason that 
higher homeownership rates imply lower renter rates and therefore a weaker presence of 
landlords. 
 
  Compared  to  the  numerous  studies  on  the  effects  of  growth  controls,  empirical 
evidence on its determinants  is still scarce, and the existing  analyses almost exclusively 
examine North American cities.
1 The existing studies generally conclude that a community’s 
growth policy is strongly influenced by prior population growth and given population density 
(see  for  example  Bates  and  Santerre,  1994;  Evenson  and Wheaton,  2003;  Glaeser  and 
Ward, 2009). Most studies also find that controls are more stringent in communities with a 
higher income level (Pogodzinski et Sass, 1994; Evenson and Wheaton, 2003; McDonald 
and McMillen, 2004). 
                                                              
1 The earlier literature on the determinants of zoning choices is reviewed in Pogodzinski (1992).   5 
Still, no consensus emerges from the existing literature regarding the influence of the 
homeownership rate: the results obtained by Pogodzinski and Sass (1994) and Glaeser and 
Ward  (2009)  point  to  a  negative  relationship  between  the  homeownership  rate  and  the 
stringency  of  controls.  Dubin  et  al.  (1992),  on  the  contrary,  find  a  positive  relationship, 
whereas the results of Brueckner (1998) indicate no significant influence of the percentage of 
homeowners in the local population. 
The influence of pressure groups other than the resident homeowners has only rarely 
been  analysed.  Lubell  et  al.  (2005)  and  Glaeser  and  Ward  (2009)  discover  a  significant 
negative  relationship  between  restrictive  growth  policies  and  the  local  importance  of  the 
construction sector, which can be interpreted as a proxy for the lobbying efforts undertaken 
by the members of an “urban growth machine”.  
 
  Drawing on the aforementioned theoretical and empirical literature, our article makes 
two contributions to the analysis of the determinants of local growth control decision. 
First of all, we present a theoretical model that clearly separates the interests of the 
two major  opponents  in  the  political  struggle  regarding  this  decision,  i.  e.  the  owners  of 
developed and undeveloped land. Except for Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2009), other models 
developed so far fail to take account of this fundamental opposition, as they consider the 
owners of land as one single interest group, no matter if their land is developed or not. 
Second, we extend the strategic reactions across cities’ political decisions to the fact 
that  cities’  decisions  to  control  their  own  development  are  spatially  conditioned.  More 
precisely, our analysis takes into account that a city’s decision to set up growth controls 
generally  creates  spillover  effects  and  increases  demand  for  land  and  housing  in  other 
cities.
2 Local growth control choices will therefore be spatially interdependent and cities will 
engage in strategic interaction. These strategic interactions have first been integrated in a 
model on growth control decisions by Brueckner (1995) and Helsley and Strange (1995), but 
without modelling their spatial pattern. The only empirical test so far is provided by Brueckner 
(1998),  who,  using  spatial  econometric  techniques,  shows  that  Californian  cities  tend  to 
impose  more  stringent  growth  controls  when  neighbouring  cities  are  doing  so.  Although 
spatial econometrics have proven useful for the empirical analysis of strategic interactions 
between governments (Brueckner, 2003 ; Revelli, 2005), filling the gap between theoretical 
models and spatial econometric specifications remains a challenge (Behrens and Thisse, 
2007). 
                                                              
2 Empirical evidence for spillover effects to adjacent jurisdictions is given by Pollakowski and Wachter (1990) 
and Cho and Linneman (1993).   6 
In  the  present  article, we  extend  the  analysis  of  Helsley  and  Strange  (1995)  and 
establish the equilibrium for the case of multiple interacting cities. Moreover, contrary to the 
existing literature,  we integrate the fundamentally geographic nature  of  interdependences 
and present a spatial econometric specification that is directly derived from the theoretical 
model. We thus try to make a first step to bridging the gap between theoretical modelling and 
spatial econometric specifications.  
 
  The remainder of the article is divided into four parts. The next section introduces the 
theoretical model. Considering strategic interactions in prices, we model the internal as well 
as the external forces shaping a city’s growth control decision, and derive a theoretically 
motivated estimation equation exhibiting spatial interactions. Our empirical test, presented in 
section 3, is thus naturally based on spatial econometric tools. Making use of standard as 
well  as  Bayesian  spatial  econometric  methods,  we  analyse  the  factors  influencing  the 
decision of French local governments to raise the “taxe locale d’équipement” (or TLE for 
short), a local development tax which can be regarded as a price measure to control growth. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study of the determinants of growth control choices for the 
French case. The results of our empirical analysis, which are presented in section 4, confirm 
the existence of strategic interaction between nearby cities as well as the global influence of 
the pressure groups: landowners and homeowners for instance. The individual pressure of 
each group is investigated. Our results lend more support to Brueckner and Lai (1996) and 
Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2009) who emphasize the influence of absentee homeowners, as 
to  Fischel’s  homevoter  hypothesis  (Fischel,  2001).  There  is  only  weak  evidence  for  the 
existence  of  “urban  growth  machines”  in  France.  Section  5  contains  some  concluding 
remarks and suggestions for future empirical research.   7 
2  Theoretical Model 
 
  Extending the work of Helsley and Strange (1995) to the multi-city case, we consider 
the strategic adoption of growth control policies in a closed system of cities. Municipalities 
aim at controlling urban extension through development fees which raise the settlement cost 
in the city and impact population moves across cities. Growth control choices are modelled 
as  the  result  of  a  political  struggle  between  different  land-related  lobbying  groups,  and 
considered as interdependent, due to their impact on residential location. Households move 
to another city when they perceive a utility difference at the expense of their actual city of 
residence, but their perception of what happens in other cities is supposed to be limited. This 
imperfect  mobility  due  to  limited  perception  is  taken  into  account  by  the  cities’  reaction 
functions derived from our model. 
 
 
2.1  Intra-urban equilibrium 
 
The urban setting 
  We consider a system of monocentric cities  { } 0,1,..., j J ∈ , occupying linear strips of 
land. As traditionally assumed in monocentric urban models, each city has a single central 
business district (CBD) located in 0, that concentrates all employment. One unit of land at 
each  distance  to  the  CBD  is  devoted  to  residential  occupation.  Thus,  every  residential 
location in a city is characterised by its distance  x to the CBD. Each city  j  extends up to a 
maximum distance of   j x . 
All  j n  inhabitants of city  j  are renters. They are mobile between cities and work in the CBD, 
where they earn an income  j y . The total population  N  of the urban system is: 
 
   
0
J
j j N n
= =∑                       [1] 
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We assume that land consumption is inelastic and that each household consumes one unit 
of land. Population size thus equals the physical size of the city:  j j n x = . 
 
The household behavior 
  The utility level of a city’s inhabitants depends on their consumption of a numéraire 
j C  and of residential land, fixed to unity, as well as on the quality of life  j Q  in their city of 
residence.  Due  to  congestion  or  other  disamenity  effects,  the  quality  of  life  in  a  city  is 
supposed to decline with the size of the city.  It is represented by the following function: 
 
    j j j Q n x β β = − = −                     [2] 
 
where  0 β ≥   represents  the  externality  parameter.  As  Helsley  and  Strange  (1995),  we 
assume  for  simplicity  that  the  utility  function  is  additively  separable,  and  that  utility  is 
transferable. Then, utility net of land consumption can be expressed as:  
 
    j j j u C x β = − .                     [3] 
 
The budget constraint of a household living at distance x from the CBD of city  j  is: 
 
    ( ) j j y C tx r x = + +                     [4] 
 
where tx stands for the commuting costs to the CBD and  ( ) r x  for the rent per unit of land. 
The  bid-rent  function  is  downward  sloping  and  linear  as  a  consequence  of  fixed  land 
consumption. Accordingly, and assuming that consumption is optimal, the indirect utility of a 
household living at distance  x from the CBD is 
   9 
    ( ) j j j v y tx r x x β = − − −                   [5] 
 
Intra urban equilibrium 
  The intra-urban equilibrium is attained when no household wants to change location 
anymore, i.e. when any two households of city  j , localised at different distances 
A x  and 
B x  
from the CBD, obtain the same utility level: 
 
    ( ) ( )
A A B B
j j j j y x tx r x y x tx r x β β − − − = − − −             [6] 
 
which simplifies to: 
 
    ( ) ( )
B A A B r x r x tx tx − = −                   [7] 
 
  Then as usual, two households living in the same city but at different distances from 
the CBD attain the same utility level if the difference between their respective transport costs 
is exactly compensated by the difference between the land rents. 
  If the opportunity cost of urban land is zero, all cities naturally extend until  ( ) 0 j r x = . 
In  contrast,  a  positive  land  rent  at  the  boundary  of  the  city  means  that  the  city  actively 







                                                              
3 As the model is static in nature, we actually do not analyse growth control policies, i.e. instruments restricting a 
city’s growth, but policies that restrict its size. As the conclusions of the analysis are similar to the ones in a 
dynamic setting, many authors use the simpler static case to analyse growth controls (Brueckner, 1999).   10
2.2  Growth controls 
 
  Following Helsley and Strange (1995) one can distinguish growth control measures 
that  directly  limit  population  size  through  some  land  use  regulations  and  “price  control” 
measures  designated  to  indirectly  influence  land  prices.  While  Brueckner  (1998) 
concentrates on the first kind of these measures, we are interested in the second one.  
 
  We define a price control as the instauration of an entry fee  j p  to the city, i.e. a 
minimum  land  rent  for  everyone  who  wants  to  locate  in  city  j .  Thus,  land  rent  at  the 
boundary becomes  ( ) j j r x p = , and land rent can now be denoted as: 
 
    ( ) ( ) j j r x p t x x = + −                     [8] 
 
Substituting [8] in [5]  we obtain the level of  indirect utility in city  j   as a  function  of the 
characteristics of the city: 
 
    ( ) j j j j v y t x p β = − + −                   [9] 
 
According to [8], the growth control raises land rents everywhere in the city, inducing 
a part of the population to move to another city. The size of the controlling city declines, 
whereas the size of the other cities increases. The growth control thus affects the utility level 
of the controlling city’s population in two different ways. On the one hand, the population 
decline raises the quality of life, which in turn increases the level of utility. On the other hand, 
the  utility  level  is  reduced  by  the  rise  of  land  rent  caused  by  the  growth  control.  In  the 
remaining  cities  (that  do  not  have  set  growth  controls),  the  utility  level  has  to  decline, 
because the in-migration from the city having set the growth control reduces quality of life. In 
the  resulting  inter-urban  equilibrium  with  growth  controls,  the  prevailing  utility  level  will 
therefore be lower than without growth controls. To reach this equilibrium, the negative utility 
effect in the active city has to dominate the positive effect.   11
2.3  Inter-urban equilibrium 
 
Household behavior 
Households move  when  they  observe  that  they  can  attain  a  higher  utility  level  in 
another city. The literature generally assumes that households are perfectly aware of any 
difference between any two cities’ utility levels. Under this view, an inter-urban equilibrium is 
attained  when  city  populations  have  adjusted  so  as  to  perfectly  equalise  utility  levels 
everywhere. Contrarily to this assumption, we suppose that households have an imperfect 
perception of the utility levels attainable in all other cities. More precisely, we assume that 
households are unable to observe policy choices and living conditions (i.e. income levels) in 
all other cities of the urban system, whereas actual city sizes are considered as known. 
The level of knowledge of a household living in city i concerning earnings and policy 
choices in city  j  is captured by the term  ij w . The household is perfectly aware of what 
happens in his own city ( 1 ii w = ), for all other cities his perception is imperfect ( 1 ij w <  for 
i j ≠ ).  
  This drives a wedge between the utility actually realised in city  j , given by equation 
[9],  and the perception of city  j ’s utility level by the inhabitants of city i:  
 
    ( ) ( ) ij ij j j j v w y p t x β = − − + ￿                 [10] 
 
  A household moves to another city when the utility level in his place of residence is 
lower than his perception of the utility he could realise elsewhere. The less reliable a city i  
household’s information on city  j ’s income level and policy choice, the more he will base his 
judgement of the utility level in city  j  on the city’s actual size, which is the only information 
he captures with no noise. In consequence, he will more easily move to cities he knows 
better, whereas changes in cities he knows less have to be important before he will consider 
relocating.  
As  in  models  of  yardstick  competition  (Salmon,  1987;  Besley  and  Case,  1995), 
households judge their own local government on the basis of a comparison with the local 
governments  of  other  jurisdictions.  But  contrarily  to  the  yardstick  competition  case, 
households in our model do not vote at the ballot box, but they “vote with their feet” as in   12
Tiebout (1956), i.e. their comparison of political choices in their hometown and in other towns 
does not condition electoral but mobility choices. Therefore, our model is actually not one of 
yardstick competition but fits better in the category of what Brueckner (2003) calls “resource 
flow models”.   
 
Inter urban equilibrium 
  An  inter-urban  equilibrium  is  attained  when  no  household  perceives  any  utility 
differences between its place of residence and the other cities any more: 
 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) i i i ij j j j y p t x w y p t x β β − − + = − − +     , i j ∀         [11] 
 
Combined with [1] and summed up over all cities  j , equation [11] can be expressed as: 
 
   
0 0
( 1) ( 1) ( 1)( ) ( )
J J
i i i ij j ij j
j j
J y J p J t x w y w p t N β β
= =
+ − + − + + = − − + ∑ ∑     [12] 
 
With  1 ii w =  and under the assumption that city 0 is passive  0 ( 0) p =





( , ) ( )
( 1)( )
J J
i i j i ij j i ij j
j j
j i j i






  = − − + + +   + +  
 
∑ ∑   , i j ∀     [13] 
 
  Equation [13] indicates the population sizes guaranteeing an inter-urban equilibrium 
contingent on the characteristics and the growth control choices made by all cities in the 
urban system. 
                                                              
4  The  city  indexed  0  has  to  be  passive,  as  we  examine  a  closed  system  of  cities  and  suppose  that  land 
consumption is fixed.   13
If the local government in city  i decides to set stricter growth controls by increasing 
the development fee  i p , land rents will rise, lowering the utility level in i. Thus, a part of its 
population  will  decide  to  move  to  another  city  and  population  size  will  decline.  On  the 
contrary, an increase in the degree of severity of growth controls in another city  j  will have 
the inverse effect on population size in i, its magnitude depending again on the parameters 
β  and t, and the population’s level of knowledge of political choices in  j . 
An increase in the revenue of the residents of city  i augments the local utility level, 
making the city more attractive than the other cities in the urban system. Following [13], this 
will cause in-migration to city  i and increase the city’s population until a new inter-urban 
equilibrium is reached, in which the general utility level is higher than before. Thus, under 
mobility, an increase in revenues in one single city makes households in the whole urban 
system  better  off.  If  revenues  rise  in  any  other  city,  city  i  becomes  less  attractive  in 
comparison, encouraging a part of its population to leave. The magnitude of the population 
decline in city  i depends on the magnitude of parameters  β  and  t, and on the extent to 
which the residents of i become aware of the higher revenues realised elsewhere.  
 
 
2.4  Local public decision making in the presence of interdependencies 
 
We assume that local politicians are opportunistic and that they seek to maximise 
their own personal welfare. This means that they will cater their political decisions in favour of 
the interest groups that are able to procure them the highest benefits.
5 We do not make any 
supposition about the exact kind of benefits politicians are seeking.  
  As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume that the promises of an interest 
group  to  local  politicians  are  conditional  on  the  political  choices  of  the  government  and 
proportional to the benefits the group obtains once the policy is implemented. In this case, 
the  local  government’s  objective  function  can  be  written  as  the  weighted  sum  of  the 
respective interests of these groups. 
 
                                                              
5 For simplicity, we assume that local politicians completely ignore the well-being of the local population.   14
  In the political struggle for a city’s decision to set an entry fee  i p , the two major  
opponents  are  the  owners  of  developed  land  and  the  owners  of  undeveloped  land.  The 
former benefit from control-induced rent-increases, whereas the latter are logically opposed 
to every form of restriction limiting the possibilities to develop the land they possess.  
The  goal  pursued  by  the  owners  of  developed  land  is  the  maximisation  of  the 
aggregated land rent: 
 







i i i i R r x dx p x tx = = + ∫                [14] 
 
As growth controls limit city size, they disable landowners next to the city limit from 
developing  their  land  and  from  realising  a  positive  land  rent.  These  owners  of  land  that 
remains undeveloped due to the instauration of growth controls are thus strictly opposed to 
them. We suppose that these owners of undeveloped land still have a stake in the city’s 
decision making process, even if they are formally no longer part of the city, and for the sake 
of simplicity, we further assume that their benefits are proportional to city size  i x .    
 
The local government maximises the weighted sum of these opposing interests: 
 
   
2 1
2
u d u d
i i i i i i i i i i i z x z R z x z p x tx π   = + = + +  
 
            [15] 
 
As  explained  above,  the  weights 
u
i z and 
d
i z   accorded  to  the  interests  of  the  owners  of 
undeveloped and developed land depend on their respective lobbying efforts, i.e. on their 
promises to the local government.  
 
The inter-urban political equilibrium 
  All active cities simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose the boundary rents  i p  
that maximise their respective objective functions  i π . In a Nash equilibrium, their choices of   15
development  fees  are  mutual  best  responses.  Substituting  [13]  in  [15],  we  obtain  the 
objective function of the government of city i  as a function of its own fee  i p  and of the fees 
chosen by the other active governments. Maximisation of this objective function with respect 
to  i p  gives city  i ’s optimal growth control choice depending on the growth control choices 
made by the other cities:
6 
 




i i ij j ij j d
j j i
j i j i
z
p a bJy b w y b w p c
z = =
≠ ≠
= − + − + + ∑ ∑            [16] 
with:   
1
0
( 1)2 ( 2)
a








( 1)( ) ( 1)2 ( 2)
J t
b





+ + + + +
 
    ( )
( )
( 1) ( )
0
( 1)( ) ( 1)2 ( 2)
J t t N
c





+ + + + +
 
 
The sufficient condition for a maximum is verified as long as  0
d
i z > , i.e. as long as the local 
government does not completely ignore the interests of the owners of developed land.  
 
The best response of city i  to a change in the growth control politics of any other city 
j  is given by the partial derivative of  [16] with respect to  j p : 
 










                   [17] 
 
Equation  [17]  indicates  that  the  growth  control  choices  of  two  cities  are  strategic 
complements:  if  city  j   enacts  more  stringent  controls,  this  will  encourage  a  part  of  its 
                                                              
6 Details are given in appendix A1.   16
population to move to another city. Thus, the growth controls implemented in  j  increase the 
growth pressure in the rest of the urban system, and in response to this, other cities will be 
tempted to set stricter controls, too.  
The intensity of city  i ’s response to a political change in  j  depends on  ij w , that is 
the extend to which city  i residents are aware of policy changes in  j . Only if households 
living in city i take notice of a policy change in  j , they will consider to migrate, and only in 
this case will the local government in i react to a policy change in  j .  
 
  Interactions  between  local  growth  control  decisions  within  the  urban  system  are 
formally expressed by the matrix form of equation [16]: 
 
    c a bJ b b = − + − + p ι z y Wy Wp              [18] 
 
where p is the  1 J ×  vector of the cities’ growth control choices, z  is a  1 J ×  vector of relative 








≡ ,  y  is  the  1 J ×   vector  of  household 
income,  ι is a  1 J ×  vector of ones and  W the  J J ×  matrix of the terms  ij w , representing 




3  Empirical framework 
 
In  our  theoretical  framework,  we  emphasize  that  a  city’s  population  cannot  be 
perfectly informed about political choices and living conditions in all other cities, and we show 
how this perception conditions their location choices and thereby the intensity of strategic 
interactions between cities regarding growth control choices.  
It seems quite natural to us to assume that the residents of a city more easily notice 
what happens in nearby cities compared to more distant ones, due for example to their trip   17
habits and to information provided by regional newspapers and other local media. If one 
wants  to  accept this  hypothesis,  strategic  interactions  between  cities  will  then  take  on  a 
spatial pattern. Under this hypothesis, the matrix  W can be understood as a spatial weight 
matrix.  Our  theoretically  derived  equation  [18]  can  then  be  interpreted  as  a  spatial 
autoregressive  model  (Anselin,  1988),  making  spatial  econometrics  a  natural  tool  for  its 
estimation.  
  Our empirical study concerns growth control decisions in 351 French Metropolitan 
Areas. The present section details our estimation approach and the data used to test the 
presence of spatial strategic interactions across cities and the impact of lobbies on local 
political decisions regarding growth control choices.  
 
 
3.1  Spatial patterns of interactions in a multi-city case 
 
Giving  the  weight  matrix  W  a  spatial  interpretation,  the  matrix  of  cities’  reaction 
functions (equation [18]) becomes a spatial autoregressive model, which formally links the 
dependent variable p to its spatial lag Wp  on the right hand side, besides other explanatory 
variables  z ,  y and  Wy. In this type of model, a change in an explanatory variable for a 
single city can potentially affect the dependent variables in all other cities, and this will cause 
feedback effects on the first. When calculating the marginal impacts, one has to take account 
of these feedback loops (Ertur and Koch, 2007 ; LeSage and Pace, 2009).  
Concerning lobbying efforts, the marginal impacts can be expressed as:
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7 Details are given in appendix A2.   18
where 
( ) s
ij w  is the element of row i  and column  j  of 
s W , i.e. the matrix  W to the power of 
s .
8 As indicated by equations [19] and [20], the marginal impacts of relative lobbying efforts 
in  i or  j  on growth control choices in i  are negative. Recalling that 
u d
i i i z z z =  decreases 
with  the  lobbying  effort  of  homeowners 
d
i z   and  increases  with  the  lobbying  effort  of 
landowners 
u
i z ,  we  can  conclude  that  the  marginal  impact  of  the  landowners’  lobby  on 
growth control choices is negative, whereas the marginal impact of the homeowners’ lobby is 
positive. Thus, if the lobbying of the owners of undeveloped land in city i becomes relatively 
more intensive, compared to the lobbying effort of the owners of developed land, the local 
government will respond by setting stricter controls. As explained above, this will increase 
the growth pressure in the rest of the urban system and encourage other local governments 
to set stricter controls, too, as indicated by [20]. This in turn will cause feedback effects on 
city i and will reinforce the impact of the local lobbying groups on the growth control choices 
made in i, as shown in [19]. 
 
  Turning to the marginal impact of city’s income, we obtain the following expressions: 
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Equations [21] and [22] describe the marginal impacts of income city  i and in city  j on the 
growth control choices in city  i. These can be expected to be positive as long as  J  is not 
too small, that is as long as competition between cities with respect to household location 
choices  is  large  enough.  If  the  income  level  in  i  increases,  the  city  will  become  more 
desirable and attract new residents. This gives its local government the power to raise  i p , 
and  as  growth  control  choices  have  been  identified  as  strategic  complements  following 
equation [17], this will encourage other cities to increase controls as well. Therefore, growth 
                                                              
8 For example, 
2 W  represents the neighbours of city i’s neighbours, 
3 W  stands for the neighbours of the 
neighbours’ neighbours, and so on. Although the diagonal elements of the matrix  W are zero, those of 
2 W  will 
generally not be zero, reflecting the fact that city i  will be a neighbour of its neighbours.      19
control choices in city i will in general become stricter with rising income in i or in any other 
city  j . 
 
 
3.2  Econometric issues 
   
In order to estimate growth control choices in equilibrium we rewrite equation [18] as 
follows: 
    0 1 2 α α α γ ρ ε = + + + + + p ι z y Wy Wp             [23] 
 
where ε  is a  1 J ×  vector of error terms and the parameters from the theoretical model have 
been replaced by  0 c α ≡ ,  1 a α ≡ − ,  2 bJ α ≡  and  b ρ γ = − ≡ . Equation [23] is a spatial lag 
specification whose OLS estimation is affected by simultaneity bias, resulting in biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates (Anselin, 1988). To overcome this problem, we estimate 
our  model  using  Maximum  Likelihood  (ML)  estimation.  In  addition,  we  perform  Bayesian 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods in order to check the robustness of our results 
to  heteroscedasticity  and  potential  outliers.
  9  The  regularity  conditions  of  the  maximum 
likelihood estimators are described in Lee (2004) and the Bayesian heteroscedastic MCMC 
estimation method is developed by LeSage (1997). 
 
The elements of weight matrix  W are specified so as to reflect our prior expectation 
that the residents of a city more easily notice what happens in nearby cities compared to 
more  distant  ones.  To  encounter  the  risk  of  arbitrariness,  we  present  results  for  three 
different specifications for  W. Our base specification assumes that the inhabitants of every 
city observe what happens in the same number of neighbouring cities, setting the number of 
neighbours arbitrarily to five. Thus, we set
* 1 ij w =  for the elements indicating the interactions 
between city  i and its five nearest neighbours, and 
* 0 ij w =  for all others. In order to check 
the robustness of our results, we also perform estimations using two other matrices with 
varying weights based on the distance between cities. The first one of these two states that a 
                                                              
9  The  underlying  functions  are  kindly  provided  by  James  LeSage  in  his  Econometric  Toolbox  for  Matlab 
(http://www.spatial-econometrics.com).    20
household’s  perception of  another  city’s  living  conditions  and  political choices  diminishes 
directly with the distance between the two cities. Every element 
*
ij w  of the un-standardised 
matrix 
* W  is equal to 
* 1/ ij ij w d = , where  ij d represents the great-circle distance between the 
cities i and  j . Finally, in the third case we use the inverse of squared distance, 
* 2 1/ ij ij w d = , 
which means that we suppose that the household’s perception of what happens in other 
cities is very sensitive to distance. 
The weight matrices are row standardised, so that the sum of every line is equal to 1. 













With this standardisation, the term  ij j
j
w p ∑  simply represents the weighted average of the 
other cities’ growth control choices as observed by the residents of city i . 
By convention,  ii w  is set to zero  i ∀ . Note that contrary to this, in the theoretical part 
we have supposed that the  population  perfectly observes what happens in its own town 
which means  1 = ii w . However, the theoretically derived equation for cities’ growth control 
choices (equation [16]) excluded the city’s own policy choice in the term representing the 
weighted growth control choices of the other cities. This is the same as including the case 




3.3  The spatial level of analysis 
 
  Concerning  the  appropriate  geographical  level  of  analysis,  there  is  so  far  no 
consensus in the empirical literature on growth controls. While Evenson and Wheaton (2003) 
or Glaeser and Ward (2009) study land use regulations on the level of municipalities (cities 
and towns), Malpezzi et al. (1998), Mayer and Somerville (2000) and Glaeser et al. (2005) all 
choose Metropolitan Areas as the level of their analysis.    21
  In  theoretical  models  as  ours,  every  city  possesses  its  own  CBD  to  which  the 
inhabitants commute for work. Thus, as Brueckner (1998) remarks, it would not be adequate 
to use the model as a theoretical foundation for the estimation of interactions between the 
different  communities  of  a  single  metropolitan  area.  Every  city  in  the  model  has  to  be 
interpreted as an entire metropolitan area. We therefore retain as the spatial level of our 
empirical analysis the French “aires urbaines” which include all municipalities belonging to 
the same local labour market and roughly correspond to Metropolitan Areas in the United 
States. 
 
  The analysis is taken out for all 354 French “aires urbaines”, except Paris, Bastia and 
Ajaccio. The latter have been discarded because of their isolated location (on the island of 
Corsica) and because of missing data for Ajaccio. The metropolitan area of Paris has been 
excluded from the analysis because TLE computation differs there from other urban areas: in 
fact, for nearly all municipalities belonging to the Ile de France region the rate of the TLE is 
augmented by an additional one percentage point, and in addition, the lump-sum values per 
square meter to which the rates of the TLE are applied differ between the municipalities of 
the Ile de France region and those of the rest of France. 
 
 
3.4  The growth control variable 
 
  Focusing  on  the  price  dimension  of  growth  control  policies  in  French  cities,  we 
analyse the “taxe locale d’équipement” (TLE) collected by municipalities. The TLE is a local 
development  tax  similar  to  North  American  impact  fees,  which  has  to  be  paid  by  the 
developer  when  he  is  granted  a  building  permit  by  the  municipality.  It  aims  at  making 
developers contribute to the costs of public equipments and infrastructures, but unlike impact 
fees in the United States, the revenues generated by the TLE are not bound to the financing 
of amenities for the new developments (i.e. there are no “rational nexus” conditions).
10 The 
amount to be paid by the beneficiary of the building permit is based on an administratively 
assessed value of the building. This is determined on a lump-sum basis as the product of the 
net  built  surface  and  a  constant  value  per  square  meter,  which  depends  on  the  type  of 
                                                              
10 Besides that, the TLE does not necessarily apply to large urban development zones (“zones d’aménagement 
concerté”), where the sharing of infrastructure and other public amenity costs can be directly negotiated between 
the municipality and the developer. Unfortunately, data concerning these negotiated contribution schemes is not 
easily available.   22
building (agricultural, industrial, residential,…) and currently varies between 95€ and 640€ 
(98-704€ in the greater Paris region). The so determined estimated value of the building is 
multiplied by the rate of the TLE decided by the municipality (which can also vary between 
building types). This rate can be raised up to 5% by the city council. It is the political choice 
regarding this rate that our analysis is interested in.  
  Our data concerns the year 2001 and stems from the French ministry in charge of 
land use and town planning. In order to construct the dependent variable for our analysis, we 
first have calculated for every municipality belonging to one of the 351 metropolitan areas in 
our  sample  the  simple  average  of  the  rates  fixed  in  the  different  building  categories. 
Thereafter, we have aggregated these data by calculating the weighted average for each 
metropolitan area, weighting every municipality by its respective population.   
 
 
3.5  The explanatory variables 
 
  Following equation [23], a city’s choice of the TLE-rate depends on the income level 
of its population, on their knowledge of the earnings and policy choices in other cities, and it 
also varies with the pressure exerted by the land related interests.
11 The income is measured 
as the median of the fiscal revenues per household in 2000, published by INSEE-DGI
12.  
  As explained above, we distinguish two land based interest groups: the owners of 
developed land, favouring strict growth controls and the owners of undeveloped land, which 
are  strictly  opposed  to  controls.  The  empirical  model  derived  from  our  theoretical  model 
indicates that the relevant variable is the relative strength of the lobbying efforts undertaken 
by these two groups. To stick as close as possible with this theoretically derived closed form 
solution, we present results using the ratio of the pressure both groups exert, but in order to 
obtain  more  detailed  and  informative  results,  we  also  conducted  analyses  with  separate 
variables for each group. 
  As  we  do  not  have  any  direct  measures  of  the  lobbying  activities  of the  different 
groups, we approximate them by the presence of each group in the urban area. In a first 
series of estimations, we consider the economic activities generated by the two lobbies. The 
pressure exerted by the “absentee” owners of developed land (landlords), is approximated by 
the relative importance of real estate activities in the local economy. In fact, we suppose that 
                                                              
11 Summary statistics for all variables used in our analyses are presented in table 1. 
12 INSEE is the French National Statistical Institute and DGI is similar to the US Internal Revenue Service.   23
a large percentage of the landlords confers the administration of their property to a realtor, 
and as the remuneration of these realtors is generally calculated as a percentage of the rent 
the property procures to its owner, the realtors pursue the same interest as the owners, i.e. 
the  maximisation  of  this  rent.  Thus,  we  approximate  the  influence  of  the  “absentee” 
homeowners by the percentage of real estate activities in local employment. 
Following  Lubell  et  al.  (2005)  and  Glaeser  and Ward  (2009)  we  assume  that  the 
pressure exerted by the “growth machines” lobby, including owners of undeveloped land, 
may be taken into account by the activity in the construction sector. Accordingly, we use the 
percentage of local employees working in the construction sector. The data for both variables 
stems  from  the  French  Unemployment  Insurance  Agency  Unédic  and  refers  to  the  year 
2000.
13  
In a second series of estimations, we replace these two measures for the lobbying of 
land  based  interests  groups  by  two  alternative  variables.  The  lobbying  of  the  owners  of 
developed land is now represented by the homeownership rate in the local population, and 
the pressure exerted by the owners of undeveloped land is approximated by the percentage 
of farmers in the local active population. These are census data provided by the French 
National Statistical Institute INSEE and refer to the year 1999.  
In order to obtain more detailed and informative results concerning the influence of 
the interest groups, we extend the benchmark model to absolute lobbying efforts for each 
group instead of the relative one. Thus, in total we have four different specifications with 
regard to the influence of lobbying: a first one with the ratio of real estate to construction 
activities, a second one using the ratio of the relative importance of farmers to homeowners, 
a third one with two distinct variables for real estate and construction activities, and a forth 
one with two separate variables for farmers and homeowners. 
 
  The model developed above highlights the importance of the political determinants of 
growth controls, but this doesn’t preserve that other factors may play a role, too. Empirical 
studies on the non political determinants of growth controls in North American Cities have 
stressed the impact of prior population growth and population density (Bates and Santerre, 
1994; Evenson and Wheaton, 2003; Glaeser and Ward, 2009). In addition, it seems that the 
fiscal stress in indebted municipalities mitigates political growth management decisions (Diaz 
and Green, 2001). In our robustness analysis we therefore introduce three supplementary 
explanatory  variables,  which  are  the  population  density,  the  rate  of  population  growth 
                                                              
13  Employment  as  measured  by  Unédic  comprises  all employees  of  industrial  or  commercial  private  sector 
establishments that employ at least one person under a labour contract.   24
between  1990  and  1999  and  the  average  debt  per  capita  in  the  municipalities  of  the 
metropolitan area. These three variables should all be positively correlated with the average 
rate of the TLE. In more densely populated metropolitan regions, the negative externalities 
related to growth should be felt more intensely by the local population, and in highly indebted 
metropolitan regions, the pressure to make new residents contribute to the financing of new 
infrastructure should likewise be stronger. In metropolitan areas that experienced strong prior 
population  growth  we  expect  both,  the  desire  to  limit  negative  externalities  and  to  fairly 
distribute infrastructure costs, to be stronger. 
The  population  density  is  measured  as  the  number  of  inhabitants  per  square 
kilometre in the metropolitan area. It is based on population data from the census of 1999 
and on data on the surface of the municipalities provided by the French National Geographic 
Institute (IGN). The data concerning public debt per capita in 2000 stems from the French 
Ministry of the Interior. This variable describes the weighted average of the debt per capita in 





4  Empirical results 
 
  Compared to other empirical studies of local strategic interactions concerning growth 
controls (Brueckner, 1998) or other public policies (Case et al., 1993 ; Revelli, 2001) using 
spatial econometrics, our empirical model is formally derived from the theoretical modelling 
of control growth decision making. Our  benchmark  estimation is  based on equation  [23], 
which constitutes a spatial autoregressive model. 
  In  our benchmark case, the empirical model  is estimated by  Maximum Likelihood 
using  the  five-nearest-neighbours  weight  matrix.  However,  the  assumption  of  spatial 
interactions  needs  to  be  tested,  that  is  we  have  to  control  not  only  whether  the  spatial 
parameter  ρ  is significantly different from 0 but to test the null hypothesis of absence of 
                                                              
14 For lack of detailed data concerning the exact levels of debt, we have approximated the debt of a municipality 
by the average debt of the municipalities in the region belonging to the same size category as the municipality 
under question. For every French region we disposed of the average debt per capita of municipalities for the 
following size categories: less than 500 inhabitants; 500-1.999 inhabitants; 2.000-3.499 inhabitants; 3.500-4.999 
inhabitants;  5.000-9.999  inhabitants;  10.000-19.999  inhabitants;  20.000-49.999  inhabitants;  50.000-99.999 
inhabitants; 100.000-299.999 inhabitants and more than 300.000 inhabitants. Due to the regionalisation, this 
approximation has the advantage that the level of debt can more easily be regarded as exogenous to TLE choices.    25
spatial interdependencies in the non spatial model. This is done by performing the Moran’s I 
test developed by Cliff and Ord (1981). 
 
  We further check the robustness of our benchmark results in three directions, testing 
the  consistence  of  estimates  to  alternative  spatial  patterns,  to  additional  explanatory 
variables and to potential heteroscedasticity and outlier problems. 
 
 
4.1  Benchmark results 
 
  Results of Ordinary Least Squares estimation of the non-spatial model are displayed 
in the left part of table 2 (columns (1) to (4) according to the set of explanatory variables 
used). We perform the Moran’s I test of Cliff and Ord (1981), using the basic five-nearest-
neighbours  Wmatrix.  The  hypothesis  of  positively  spatially  autocorrelated  error  terms 
cannot be rejected at the 1% level. From an empirical point of view, this means that OLS 
results are at least inefficient and probably biased, too. From a theoretical point of view, this 
result underscores the fact that cities cannot be considered as “isolated islands” and it is 
consistent with the spatial dimension of strategic interaction between jurisdictions highlighted 
by our theoretical model.  
 
  The results of Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the spatial autoregressive model, 
using the five-nearest-neighbours weight matrix, are summarized in the right part of table 2 
(columns (5) to (8) according to the set of lobbying variables used). They largely confirm our 
theoretical model. All  estimated parameters  have the  expected  signs,  and  almost all  are 
significantly different from zero. The estimate of the spatial autocorrelation parameter  ρ  is 
significantly  different  from  zero,  indicating  that  cities  engage  in  strategic  interaction  with 
neighbouring  cities.  As  ρ   is  positive,  cities’  growth  control  choices  are  indeed  strategic 
complements, as predicted by equation [17]. The estimate associated with city’s own income 
is positive and highly significant, whereas the parameter estimate of income in neighbouring 
cities is significantly negative. Nevertheless, this is consistent with our expectation that rising 
income in neighbouring cities has a positive marginal impact on the growth control choices of 
a given city, as suggested by equation [22]. These results follow other prior results showing 
that controls are more stringent in communities with a higher income level (Pogodzinski et   26
Sass, 1994; Evenson and Wheaton, 2003; McDonald and McMillen, 2004) but extend them 
to the case of spatial interactions with neighborhing cities. 
  Our  results  also  confirm  the  hypothesis  that  local  growth  control  choices  are 
influenced by the relative lobbying-activities of land-based interest groups. More precisely we 
consider the relative pressure of landowners compared to homeowners, measured either by 
the ratio of real estate to construction activities (column (5)) or by the ratio of farmers to 
homeowners (column (6)). In both cases the coefficients have the expected negative sign. In 
conjunction with the positive value of the spatial parameter  ρ , this result implicitly suggests 
a  negative  marginal  impact  of  the  landowners’  lobby  on  growth  control  choices,  and  a 
positive marginal impact of the homeowners’ lobby. At first sight, our estimations are more 
supportive of the hypothesis of a lobbying struggle between homeowners and farmers (the 
parameter estimate in model (6) is highly significant), than of a struggle for influence between 
real estate agents and constructors (the parameter estimate is only significant at the 10% 
level in estimation (5)).  
 
 
  4.2  Landowners and homeowners distinct pressures 
 
  In estimations (7) and (8), we split up the respective ratio into two distinct variables, in 
order to measure more precisely the pressures exerted by the owners of developed land and 
by the owners of undeveloped land.  
When lobbying activities are approximated by real estate and construction activities 
(estimation (7)), the coefficient of the variable representing the landlords’ lobby is positive as 
expected and highly significant, suggesting successful pressure of absentee homeowners for 
stricter growth controls. On the contrary, the impact of the lobbying activities exerted by the 
constructor sector, representing the urban “growth machine”, is negative as expected, but 
only significant at the 10% level.  
When lobbying efforts are measured by the homeownership rate and the percentage 
of  farmers  in  the  local  active  population  (estimation  (8)),  both  parameter  estimates  are 
different from zero at the 99 % significance level. The estimate for the agricultural lobby has 
the  expected  negative  sign,  but  surprisingly  the  sign  of  the  parameter  estimate  for  the 
homeowner lobby is negative as well. Recalling that no consensus emerges from the existing 
literature  regarding  the  pressure  exerted  by  resident  homeowners,  this  result  meets   27
Pogodzinski and Sass’ (1994) and Glaeser and Ward’s (2009) findings, but contradicts the 




  4.3  Robustness analysis 
 
  Supplementary  analyses  were  conducted  in  order  to  check  the  robustness  of  our 
results in three directions. 
 
  First of all, we question the way spatial strategic interactions have been modelled and 
we extend the results to two alternative spatial patterns. We repeat our Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation  using  two  alternative  weight  matrices:  the  inverse  distance  and  the  squared 
inverse distance between cities. Contrarily to a pattern of interactions spatially bounded to a 
set  of  given  neighbouring  cities  as  for  the  five-nearest  neighbours  weight  matrix,  these 
alternative  weight  matrices  assume  that  all  cities  in  the  system  belong  to  the  set  of 
neighbours. Influence on neighbours’ political choices is now  supposed to decrease  with 
distance or even more rapidly with squared distance. Results are reported in table 3. With 
little exception, the results remain qualitatively the same. All coefficients take on the same 
sign as before and remain strongly significant, with the exception of the variable associated 
with  lagged  revenue,  which  is  less  significant  with  the  inverse  distance  matrix,  and  the 
variable representing the “urban growth machine”, which is no longer significant.  
 
  In  a  second  series  of  robustness  checks,  we  extend  the  benchmark  model  to 
additional variables which are supposed to account for alternative determinants of growth 
control decisions. In doing so we also verify that the estimated parameter representing the 
spatial strategic interaction is not artificially increased because of omitted spatially correlated 
variables. As specified above, we introduce three supplementary variables, which are the 
population density, the rate of population growth between 1990 and 1999 and the average 
debt per capita of the municipalities of the metropolitan area. According to the value of the 
log-likelihood  functions  and  the  Akaike  and  Schwarz  information  criteria,  the  inclusion  of 
these variables substantially ameliorates the explanatory strength of the estimations.   28
The parameter estimates of all supplementary variables have the expected positive 
sign and are significantly different from zero at the 99 % significance level. Higher population 
densities, higher prior growth rates or higher levels of debt all seem to be associated with 
more stringent growth controls. Note that the inclusion of these variables does not decrease 
the  significance  of  the  variables  derived  from  our  theoretical  model.  Most  parameter 
estimates become smaller in magnitude, but the results still indicate highly significant and 
positive  spatial  interactions  between  jurisdictions  and  the  relative  pressure  of  owners  of 
developed  and  undeveloped  land  also  still  exerts  sizeable  influence  on  growth  control 
choices. Compared to the results of our benchmark model, the negative influence of the 
“growth machine” becomes slightly more significant.  
 
  In a final series of estimations reported in table 5 we applied Bayesian methods to the 
benchmark as well as to the extended model.  Reflecting our prior belief in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity and potential outliers, we set the value for the hyperparameter  r  to 4. 
Besides that, we use a Uniform prior  [ ] 1,1 U −  for the spatial autocorrelation parameter ρ  as 
suggested by LeSage (1997), and diffuse priors for the other model parameters. We make 
25.000 draws of which we discard 15.000 for burn-in. 
The results remain remarkably stable, indicating that heteroscedastcity and outliers 
do  not  seem  to  constitute  serious  problems.  In  some  cases,  the  significance  levels  are 
slightly modified, but no important changes do occur, neither in significance nor coefficient 




5  Conclusion 
 
  In this paper, we model a city’s decision to control urban growth as the result of a 
political  struggle  between  the  owners  of  developed  and  undeveloped  land.  Assuming 
furthermore  that  a  city’s  decision  to  control  its  development  raises  housing  demand  in 
neighbouring  cities,  local  growth  control  choices  have  to  be  considered  as  spatially 
interdependent.  The  resulting  inter  city  equilibrium  formally  takes  the  form  of  a  spatial 
autoregressive specification.    29
  The empirical estimation of this equilibrium solution confirms the predictions of our 
model.  French  municipalities’  choices  regarding  the  local  rates  of  the  “taxe  locale 
d’équipement” are subject to positive spatial strategic interaction between jurisdictions. This 
is in line with the results of Brueckner (1998), who also finds evidence that growth control 
choices of nearby agglomerations are strategic complements. 
  The inter-city equilibrium also highlights the influence of the pressure exerted by the 
owners of undeveloped land relative to that of the owners of developed land, predicting a 
negative impact on growth control policies. This as well is broadly confirmed by our empirical 
estimation of the factors influencing local decisions regarding the “taxe locale d’équipement”: 
the relative strength of their lobbying activities seems to have considerable influence on the 
growth control rates chosen, even if other motivations for growth controls as the protection of 
amenities or fiscal motivations also seem to play a role. 
 
  As there is no consensus in the existing literature as to the identity of the interest 
group dominating the political struggle concerning local growth control decisions, we have 
further investigated this question in a series of empirical estimations in which we split up the 
variable of relative lobbying strength and consider each group individually. Concerning the 
influence of the owners of developed land, our results indicate that the real estate agents, 
who  are  supposed  to  act  on  behalf  of  the  absentee  homeowners,  indeed  favour  more 
stringent growth controls, whereas the resident homeowners do not seem to be the driving 
force  for  the  instauration  of  growth  controls.  Accordingly,  our  results  do  not  support  the 
“homevoter” hypothesis of Fischel (2001) and are more in favour of Brueckner and Lai (1996) 
and  Hilber  and  Robert-Nicoud  (2009),  who  highlight  the  importance  of  “absentee” 
homeowners. Concerning the role played by the owners of undeveloped land, as expected 
our results suggest that farmers succeed in preventing stringent growth controls. Concerning 
urban “growth machines”, we find weak evidence for their successful lobbying against growth 
controls. Clearly, this question has to be further investigated in order to understand to what 
extend the “growth machine” phenomenon actually plays a role in today’s local politics in 
France or in European cities or if it only concerns North American cities.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
   
Mean 
 
Std. dev.  Min  Max 
         
TLE rate  2.30  1.108  0.00  5.00 
Revenue per household  
(in 1000 €)   21.29  1.983  15.38  32.18 
 
Measures of lobbying intensity 
% real estate activities  1.45  1.327  0.00  9.41 
% construction   8.04  2.633  0.00  21.17 
% homeowners  55.51  6.166  36.78  81.83 
% farmers  1.02  0.691  0.00  3.79 
 
Supplementary variables 
Population density  
(in 1000 inhabitants / km²)  2.20  1.688  0.28  11.73 
Public debt  
(in 1000 €)  0.84  0.207  0.40  1.89 
Population growth 1990-99  2.82  5.046  -10.24  25.57 
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Table 2: Basic results 

















                 
Estimation method  Ordinary Least Squares  Maximum Likelihood 
Weight matrix  -  Five-nearest neighbours 




































      -0.004*** 
(-3.100) 
     
Relative lobbying strength 
2 
  -0.357*** 
(-9.301) 
      -0.226*** 
(-5.959) 
   
Landlord lobby      0.397*** 
(8.089) 
      0.264*** 
(8.08) 
 
Growth machine lobby       -0.011 
(-0.461) 
      -0.028* 
(-1.73) 
 
Homeowner lobby        -0.035*** 
(-4.142) 
      -0.023*** 
(-3.114) 
Agricultural lobby        -0.550*** 
(-8.001) 
      -0.359*** 
(5.294) 


















                 
R² adj.  0.088  0.198  0.2804  0.264         
Log-Likelihood          -318.54  -306.203  -293.78  -295.80 
Pseudo-R²          0.092  0.255  0.345  0.315 
AIC  2.271  2.137  2.032  2.055  1.838  1.768  1.7024  1.714 
BIC  2.304  2.170  2.076  2.099  1.882  1.812  1.7574  1.769 
Moran  16.1***  13.9***  11.9***  13.1***         
                 
Notes:  t-values  in  parentheses.  Asterisks  indicate  significance  at  the  10% (*),  5%  (**)  or  1%  (***)  level.  Estimations  use  the  heteroskedasticity  consistent 
covariance matrix estimator of White (1980). AIC is the Akaike (1974) information criterion. BIC is the Schwarz (1978) information criterion. Moran is the Moran’s I 
test adapted to estimated residuals (Cliff and Ord, 1981). The spatial autocorrelation tests were carried out using the 5 nearest neighbours weight matrix.   35
Table 3: Alternative weight matrices 

















                 
Estimation method  Maximum Likelihood  Maximum Likelihood 
Weight matrix  Inverse distance  Squared inverse distance 
 




































      -0.004*** 
(-2.665) 
     
Relative lobbying strength 
2 
  -0.299*** 
(-7.347) 
      -0.230*** 
(-6.015) 
   
Landlord lobby      0.326*** 
(9.450) 
      0.258*** 
(7.597) 
 
Growth machine lobby       -0.022 
(-1.258) 
      -0.021 
(-1.268) 
 
Homeowner lobby        -0.027*** 
(-3.441) 
      -0.022*** 
(-2.862) 
Agricultural lobby        -0.474*** 
(-6.539) 
      -0.376*** 
(-5.433) 
































                 
Log-Likelihood  -349.79  -328.709  -313.36  -316.26  -324.67  -310.52  -300.36  -301.70 
Pseudo-R²  0.098  0.238  0.339  0.315  0.105  0.228  0.345  0.302 
AIC  2.016  1.896  1.814  1.831  1.873  1.792  1.7399  1.748 
BIC  2.060  1.940  1.869  1.886  1.917  1.836  1.7949  1.803 
                 
Notes: (see also the notes to table 2) 
Pseudo−R² is the linear correlation coefficient between the observed explained variable and the estimated explained variable.  36
Table 4: Alternative determinants of growth control decisions 
         
  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20) 
         




Weight matrix  Five-nearest neighbours 
 




















     
Relative lobbying 
strength 2 
  -0.197*** 
(-4.804) 
   





    -0.036** 
(-2.321) 
 
Homeowner lobby        -0.020*** 
(-2.901) 
Agricultural lobby        -0.347*** 
(-4.863) 










































         
Log-likelihood  -282.67  -273.84  -263.37  -264.77 
Pseudo-R²  0.394  0.472  0.492  0.523 
AIC  1.651  1.600  1.546  1.554 
BIC  1.728  1.677  1.634  1.642 
         
Notes: (see the notes to tables 2 and 3) 
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Table 5: Bayesian estimation 

















                 
Estimation method  Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
Weight matrix  Five-nearest neighbours 




































      -0.007* 
(-1.954) 
     
Relative lobbying 
strength 2 
  -0.232*** 
(-6.533) 
      -0.202*** 
(-4.767) 
   
Landlord lobby      0.280*** 
(7.570) 
      0.216*** 
(6.029) 
 
Growth machine lobby       -0.038** 
(-2.208) 
      -0.042*** 
(-2.756) 
 
Homeowner lobby        -0.021*** 
(-2.881) 
      -0.015** 
(-2.197) 
Agricultural lobby        -0.377*** 
(-5.769) 
      -0.357*** 
(-4.792) 
























































Pseudo-R²  0.077  0.255  0.339  0.316  0.386  0.469  0.491  0.517 
# of draws  25000  25000  25000  25000  25000  25000  25000  25000 
# of draws omitted  15000  15000  15000  15000  15000  15000  15000  15000 
                 




A1. Derivation of equation [16] 
 










optimization of [15] leads to 
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which is equivalent to [16]. 
 
 
A2. Calculation of marginal impacts 
 
In order to calculate the marginal impacts of the remaining variables, we resolve equation [18] for 
p. If  0 b ≠  and if 1 b is not an eigenvalue of W, we obtain: 
 
1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) c b a b b bJ b
− − − = − − − + − − p I W ι I W z I W W y  
 
The solution of this reduced form  equation gives  the cities’ growth  control  choices in the Nash 
equilibrium. The partial derivatives are given by: 
 


















These two equations define n n ×  marginal impacts of variables on cities’ growth control choices.   
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and under the condition that  1 b <  and 0 1 ij w < < , we obtain: 
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